Evidence and Rationalism
Mar 9, 2019 13:18:57 GMT -6
Post by Todd on Mar 9, 2019 13:18:57 GMT -6
The use of physical evidence yields not proof but demonstration, not certainty but probability. It requires the use not of deduction but of induction. But does physical evidence have no bearing upon rationalism? It seems that physical evidence, when used in an attempt to prove rational principles, is either a superfluous exercise in collecting examples or a pretext for defining new principles (which themselves may be mere generalities). For while purely rational arguments need no physical evidence for support, and indeed may be impervious to empirical demonstration, such attempts may succeed in defining new models. Such a new model may seem to restrict, modify, or destroy the old one, or to reduce it to the status of one-among-many, and thereby treat the conclusion of that rational argument as nothing more than a generalization itself.
For example, with Euclid, we may maintain that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, without fear of contradiction. Seeking examples either to prove or disprove such a thesis seems silly until one sees the demonstration that what seems to be a straight line on a globe is, in reality, an arc and may be represented as a curve on a flat surface. In this case, we must see that we have been hoodwinked. For the “straight line” on the globe, which seems to be a straight line is really an arc, and not a straight line at all. Yet the straight line distance from Sidney Australia to New York City would be a tunnel through the core of the earth – still straight, still the shortest path between the two. What we have accomplished with our “demonstration” has nothing to do either with demonstration or refutation, but with creating an alternative model which deals with a different sort of Geometry.
Yet for rationalism to be considered valid or its principles true, it must touch empirical reality in such a way as to be demonstrably falsifiable, or to satisfy one’s sense of verification. Otherwise, we are free to posit Nirvana, unicorns, and two-headed Martians. In other words, rationalistic principles must be logically consistent but must also efficiently explain empirical data. Rationalism provides proof for experience, not vice versa; but this can only happen when rationalism is so related to empiricism as to be falsifiable – that is, to deal only with notions that can be falsified.
And what is it to be falsifiable? It means that rational theories, principles, and conclusions may be subjected to empirical tests. Such tests are unneeded to prove the conclusions, but a single empirical example of failure on the part of the rational conclusion falsifies or disproves it. It eliminates its certainty, by introducing impossibility or at least a degree of contingency, which for rational conclusions and principles, is the death knell. For example, astrology (or substitute your favorite superstition) can be dressed up in rational language and presented as efficient, factual explanations of some body of data. A well worked rational refutation may serve to cast doubt on it, but it will remain a matter of human choice whether to buy the refutation or hold tight to the superstition. However, a single counterexample or experiment from the physical realm dashes the rational principle to bits. One must be perverse, disinterested, or intellectually wanting to continue to hold a rational principle that has been empirically falsified.
When empirical data are limited to demonstration or falsification of, rather than to proof of rationalistic conclusions it becomes clear that the truth and validity of such conclusions is subject only to its logical consistency and the inability of empirical data to falsify them. In such a case there may be rational premises which are certain while others, because of the conflicting claims of empirical generalizations, may offer logical certainty but be less than 100% efficient empirically because of the limitations on experience itself. Compare, for example, our example of the shortest distance between two points being a straight line. It is part of a rationalistic system in which it functions consistently, and it is 100% efficient in explaining pertinent empirical data. On the other hand, while the premise that “God created the Universe” is logically consistent within the rationalistic system. It is not 100% efficient in explaining empirical data, to the satisfaction of all. Neither we nor our ancestors were present at the creation. Hence no observers witnessed it. It is not repeatable, hence it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable in the scientific sense. We have here only the “indirect” witness of logical consistency. Hence, in order to prove or disprove such a rationalistic premise, we must verify or falsify such logical components and implications of the system as come within the realm of daily experience.
Ironically, such falsification, because it is based upon intrinsically faulty experience and has nothing to do with the internal consistency of the rational system, may more likely be said to falsify the empirical data itself. That is, it may be experience which is the falsifiable element, rather than rationalism. Yet the claims and doctrines of rationalism must remain falsifiable if it is to be practical or “efficient.” And this means that experience, in order to falsify a tenet of rationalism, must itself be of such consistency and clarity as to be absolutely compelling to all who see it. That is, there can be no question about the interpretation of the empirical data; no need for experts to interpret; no arguments about its import. It must be clear, simple, and compelling to all.
- Todd
For example, with Euclid, we may maintain that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, without fear of contradiction. Seeking examples either to prove or disprove such a thesis seems silly until one sees the demonstration that what seems to be a straight line on a globe is, in reality, an arc and may be represented as a curve on a flat surface. In this case, we must see that we have been hoodwinked. For the “straight line” on the globe, which seems to be a straight line is really an arc, and not a straight line at all. Yet the straight line distance from Sidney Australia to New York City would be a tunnel through the core of the earth – still straight, still the shortest path between the two. What we have accomplished with our “demonstration” has nothing to do either with demonstration or refutation, but with creating an alternative model which deals with a different sort of Geometry.
Yet for rationalism to be considered valid or its principles true, it must touch empirical reality in such a way as to be demonstrably falsifiable, or to satisfy one’s sense of verification. Otherwise, we are free to posit Nirvana, unicorns, and two-headed Martians. In other words, rationalistic principles must be logically consistent but must also efficiently explain empirical data. Rationalism provides proof for experience, not vice versa; but this can only happen when rationalism is so related to empiricism as to be falsifiable – that is, to deal only with notions that can be falsified.
And what is it to be falsifiable? It means that rational theories, principles, and conclusions may be subjected to empirical tests. Such tests are unneeded to prove the conclusions, but a single empirical example of failure on the part of the rational conclusion falsifies or disproves it. It eliminates its certainty, by introducing impossibility or at least a degree of contingency, which for rational conclusions and principles, is the death knell. For example, astrology (or substitute your favorite superstition) can be dressed up in rational language and presented as efficient, factual explanations of some body of data. A well worked rational refutation may serve to cast doubt on it, but it will remain a matter of human choice whether to buy the refutation or hold tight to the superstition. However, a single counterexample or experiment from the physical realm dashes the rational principle to bits. One must be perverse, disinterested, or intellectually wanting to continue to hold a rational principle that has been empirically falsified.
When empirical data are limited to demonstration or falsification of, rather than to proof of rationalistic conclusions it becomes clear that the truth and validity of such conclusions is subject only to its logical consistency and the inability of empirical data to falsify them. In such a case there may be rational premises which are certain while others, because of the conflicting claims of empirical generalizations, may offer logical certainty but be less than 100% efficient empirically because of the limitations on experience itself. Compare, for example, our example of the shortest distance between two points being a straight line. It is part of a rationalistic system in which it functions consistently, and it is 100% efficient in explaining pertinent empirical data. On the other hand, while the premise that “God created the Universe” is logically consistent within the rationalistic system. It is not 100% efficient in explaining empirical data, to the satisfaction of all. Neither we nor our ancestors were present at the creation. Hence no observers witnessed it. It is not repeatable, hence it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable in the scientific sense. We have here only the “indirect” witness of logical consistency. Hence, in order to prove or disprove such a rationalistic premise, we must verify or falsify such logical components and implications of the system as come within the realm of daily experience.
Ironically, such falsification, because it is based upon intrinsically faulty experience and has nothing to do with the internal consistency of the rational system, may more likely be said to falsify the empirical data itself. That is, it may be experience which is the falsifiable element, rather than rationalism. Yet the claims and doctrines of rationalism must remain falsifiable if it is to be practical or “efficient.” And this means that experience, in order to falsify a tenet of rationalism, must itself be of such consistency and clarity as to be absolutely compelling to all who see it. That is, there can be no question about the interpretation of the empirical data; no need for experts to interpret; no arguments about its import. It must be clear, simple, and compelling to all.
- Todd