Free Will and Determinism
Mar 1, 2019 13:43:40 GMT -6
Post by Todd on Mar 1, 2019 13:43:40 GMT -6
Man is “bound to freedom” (Sartre, Abraham and Isaac, Kierkegaard). Man cannot but choose. He cannot decide not to choose.
“Bondage of the will” (Luther, Gustaf Aulen) sin is not necessary, but it is inevitable.
Therefore, thinking of something like sin, in terms either of free will or determinism is to miss several important implications concerning human behavior. For example, the very idea of there being an excuse for sin begs the question of its necessity. It seeks justification for a sinful action by recourse to a reason, a sufficient situational cause, almost as if the behavior were mechanical, when in fact such cannot be established. That is, as long as a reason is sought for a sinful action, sin is misunderstood as something mechanical, instead of something in some way psychologically deliberate. The notion is that some reason overpowered nature and caused a sinful action or response.
Sin is unnecessary but it is inevitable. Luther made it clear that sinful behavior arises from the fact that God will not allow that which is predisposed to sin to lie idle. On the other hand, the notion that sin is strictly a free choice misses the point that while behavior involves a choice of action or response, the character or nature of the behavior is not a matter of choice. Sinful behavior is sinful because man’s basic character is sinful.
Often, theological discussion has assumed that free will and predestination are at opposite ends of a spectrum and that they form an antithesis to one another. The Bible has then been carved into supporting proof texts, and each side attempts to reinterpret the proof texts of the other in terms consistent with its own position. Calvinism and Arminianism provide but one example of such an antithetical pair of theologies.
The problem is that neither side is wholly correct, because neither side seems to be aware of the real nature of the relationship of the supposed opposites. Free will is not the opposite of determinism as it involves a different aspect of being. Determinism is lifeless in the sense that it is mechanical and no choice of alternative behavior exists. It is pure necessity. It’s opposite is non-necessity, not free will.
Free will presupposes personality and that which is not physically or mechanically determined. That is, various alternative actions present themselves, and a personal choice must be made. In the sense that there is a choice to be made by a free agent, free will is indeed undetermined. But insofar as a choice must be made, that is, insofar as it is impossible not to choose some course of action, free will is determined. The antithesis here is between what is inevitable, and what is evitable; there is here an unavoidable (i.e. necessary) choice between what are avoidable options. The only impossibility in such a situation lies in avoiding a choice altogether.
The difference between these two sets of antithetical pairs (necessity/non-necessity, and inevitability, evitability) involves personality. A rock is subject only to the antithesis of necessity/non-necessity. Its entire existence is bounded by the necessity of the physical laws of nature and behaves only in accordance with the dictates of necessity. Man, however, possessing personality, is subject to an additional dimension, that of choosing how he will behave in relation to others. We may call this antithesis between inevitability and evitability the axis of morality. The other, the antithesis of necessity and non-necessity, we may call the axis of necessity.
Man is physically subject to the laws of physics. If he trips he falls. There is no choice in his reaction to gravity. However, he does have a choice in the realm of his behavior, such that he may choose either to steal or not to steal. The only thing he may not do is to decide not to choose between them. He may not decide to make no choice at all. He is bound to choose. This is the case whenever outward human behavior and social interaction are involved.
It should now be clear that man is not subject to sin in the same way he is subject to gravity, by purely mechanical relationships. It is then also clear that free will and determinism are not antithetical to one another. If a graph is drawn which contrasts personal action to physical action this can easily be visualized. Let a vertical line A-B represent the axis of necessity, “A,” at the top, being non-necessity and “B, ” at the bottom, representing necessity; And let a horizontal line M-N represent the axis of choice, “M,” at the left, being inevitability, or a forced choice of options, and “N, at the right,” representing evitability, or the ability not to choose among options.
It can now be seen that the debate has often wrongly been assumed to be between M, the free will of inevitability (where a choice of alternatives must be made), and (B) Necessity, where all behavior is predetermined. But M-B is not an antithesis at all, but the quadrant of physics. A-M properly represents the quadrant of human behavior, for it represents behavior that is not predetermined, but whose character is.
No specific sin is predetermined as necessary as if it were a mechanical motion. But whatever choice in behavior is made by fallen human nature will be sinful. And only that same power that is not subject to physical law can rescue us from the power of this ethical law. Whatever the unregenerate man (and much that the regenerate man) chooses to do is sinful. Although the act may be freely chosen, its character is predetermined by the character of his heart.
-Todd
“Bondage of the will” (Luther, Gustaf Aulen) sin is not necessary, but it is inevitable.
Therefore, thinking of something like sin, in terms either of free will or determinism is to miss several important implications concerning human behavior. For example, the very idea of there being an excuse for sin begs the question of its necessity. It seeks justification for a sinful action by recourse to a reason, a sufficient situational cause, almost as if the behavior were mechanical, when in fact such cannot be established. That is, as long as a reason is sought for a sinful action, sin is misunderstood as something mechanical, instead of something in some way psychologically deliberate. The notion is that some reason overpowered nature and caused a sinful action or response.
Sin is unnecessary but it is inevitable. Luther made it clear that sinful behavior arises from the fact that God will not allow that which is predisposed to sin to lie idle. On the other hand, the notion that sin is strictly a free choice misses the point that while behavior involves a choice of action or response, the character or nature of the behavior is not a matter of choice. Sinful behavior is sinful because man’s basic character is sinful.
Often, theological discussion has assumed that free will and predestination are at opposite ends of a spectrum and that they form an antithesis to one another. The Bible has then been carved into supporting proof texts, and each side attempts to reinterpret the proof texts of the other in terms consistent with its own position. Calvinism and Arminianism provide but one example of such an antithetical pair of theologies.
The problem is that neither side is wholly correct, because neither side seems to be aware of the real nature of the relationship of the supposed opposites. Free will is not the opposite of determinism as it involves a different aspect of being. Determinism is lifeless in the sense that it is mechanical and no choice of alternative behavior exists. It is pure necessity. It’s opposite is non-necessity, not free will.
Free will presupposes personality and that which is not physically or mechanically determined. That is, various alternative actions present themselves, and a personal choice must be made. In the sense that there is a choice to be made by a free agent, free will is indeed undetermined. But insofar as a choice must be made, that is, insofar as it is impossible not to choose some course of action, free will is determined. The antithesis here is between what is inevitable, and what is evitable; there is here an unavoidable (i.e. necessary) choice between what are avoidable options. The only impossibility in such a situation lies in avoiding a choice altogether.
The difference between these two sets of antithetical pairs (necessity/non-necessity, and inevitability, evitability) involves personality. A rock is subject only to the antithesis of necessity/non-necessity. Its entire existence is bounded by the necessity of the physical laws of nature and behaves only in accordance with the dictates of necessity. Man, however, possessing personality, is subject to an additional dimension, that of choosing how he will behave in relation to others. We may call this antithesis between inevitability and evitability the axis of morality. The other, the antithesis of necessity and non-necessity, we may call the axis of necessity.
Man is physically subject to the laws of physics. If he trips he falls. There is no choice in his reaction to gravity. However, he does have a choice in the realm of his behavior, such that he may choose either to steal or not to steal. The only thing he may not do is to decide not to choose between them. He may not decide to make no choice at all. He is bound to choose. This is the case whenever outward human behavior and social interaction are involved.
It should now be clear that man is not subject to sin in the same way he is subject to gravity, by purely mechanical relationships. It is then also clear that free will and determinism are not antithetical to one another. If a graph is drawn which contrasts personal action to physical action this can easily be visualized. Let a vertical line A-B represent the axis of necessity, “A,” at the top, being non-necessity and “B, ” at the bottom, representing necessity; And let a horizontal line M-N represent the axis of choice, “M,” at the left, being inevitability, or a forced choice of options, and “N, at the right,” representing evitability, or the ability not to choose among options.
It can now be seen that the debate has often wrongly been assumed to be between M, the free will of inevitability (where a choice of alternatives must be made), and (B) Necessity, where all behavior is predetermined. But M-B is not an antithesis at all, but the quadrant of physics. A-M properly represents the quadrant of human behavior, for it represents behavior that is not predetermined, but whose character is.
No specific sin is predetermined as necessary as if it were a mechanical motion. But whatever choice in behavior is made by fallen human nature will be sinful. And only that same power that is not subject to physical law can rescue us from the power of this ethical law. Whatever the unregenerate man (and much that the regenerate man) chooses to do is sinful. Although the act may be freely chosen, its character is predetermined by the character of his heart.
-Todd